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Abstract 
The fees charged for using federally administered lands has been a controversial topic for many 
decades. These fees are often compared to estimated forage values (shadow prices) obtained 
from a linear programming (LP) model. Researchers have shown that both the fee and non fee 
costs of grazing must be considered in setting grazing fees . LP models used to derive forage 
values must also consistently consider the fee and non fee costs of grazing . The LP model used 
in this study shows that the shadow prices derived are directly affected by how non fee variable 
costs of grazing are incorporated in a LP model. LP models that do not consistently allocate non 
fee costs for all types of forage result in shadow prices that can not be compared: Forage values 
derived using LP models must therefore be carefully evaluated with respect to the allocation of 
non fee costs of grazing before these values can be used to set grazing fees. 
Introduction 
Grazing fees are one of the most controversial topics associated with use of western 
rangelands. Numerous authors (e.g., Gardner 1989, Nielsen 1982, Pope 1989, Roberts 1963, 
Rimbey 1989) have addressed the relationship between the "value of the forage" and the grazing 
fees that are to be imposed. 
Linear programming (LP) has long been used to derive shadow prices, which approximate 
the marginal value product 1 of inputs used to produce particular outputs. Researchers have used 
this methodology to examine the use of rangelands in nearly every western state (e.g., Lewis and 
Taylor 1977, Torell et al. 1980, Bartlett et al. 1979, Wilson et al. 1985, Marousek et. a1. 1990) and 
to show how rancher incomes would be affected by changes in the use of federal lands. These 
models also yield shadow prices that have been used to establish grazing fees . 
The fees charged to graze federal lands represent only a portion of the total costs of 
grazing federal or private lands. The nonfee costs of using federal lands by livestock operators 
and other users are often ignored in discussions concerning the use of federal lands and in 
setting fees to be charged users in particular. Ignoring nonfee costs genera]]y results in a 
suggestion that fees could be higher than if these costs were included in the analysis . 
All of the, LP models we reviewed do not explicitly address how the nonfee costs of grazing 
were incorporated in the models. One would expect the allocation of these nonfee costs to affect 
the shadow prices, but how they would be affected is not clear from the studies reviewed. This 
study. therefore (1) out1ines the problems of including nonfee costs in LP models, and 
(2) illustrates how including nonfee costs affects shadow prices. 
IThese will be equal in those cases when no other inputs are allowed to vary- -a condition 
that is not always valid in most linear programming models which have constraints that are 
nonbinding. 
Methodology 
We selected the study by Hahn et al. (1989) to j]1ustrate the concepts outlined below. 
This study is widely available as are the budget data used to construct the LP models (see the 
publications by Gee 1981. 1984). Perhaps the most important reason for selecting this model 
is that it has recently been cited in Congressional hearings concerning the grazing fee. 
The structure of an LP model is critical in any discussion of this tool. A profit 
maximization model. the most common model used in grazing decisions (see discussion in Kent 
1989), will usually maximize net ranch income subject to the constraints faced by the 
operator(s). The values in the objective function (the primary focus of this paper) represent the 
gross returns less variable costs of an activity such as grazing federal or private land. The 
manner in which these objective function values are constructed is discussed below. 
Data 
Nonfee costs 
Numerous studies have outlined the nonfee costs of grazing federal lands (e.g., Obermiller 
and Lambert 1984, Nielsen 1982, Madsen and Gee 1978, USDA and USDl 1986). An example of 
these costs is shown in Table 1. These costs commonly vary by season, type, and area of use. 
which makes it ,difficult to determine the fee and nonfee costs of grazing a particular area. 
Table 1. Average nonfee costs of grazing livestock on federal lands for 1966 and 1990.1 
Cost of ltern 1966 1990 
Lost animals $0.60 $1.82 
Association fee 0.08 0.27 
Veterinary 0.11 0.45 
Moving livestock to and from allotments 0.24 1.11 
Herding 0.46 1.86 
Salting and feeding 0.56 2.32 
Travel to and from allotments 0.32 1.49 
Water 0.08 0.27 
Fence maintenance 0.24 0.89 
Horse 0.16 0.50 
Water maintenance 0.19 0.69 
Development depreciation 0.11 0.37 
Other costs 0.13 0.44 
J 
TOTAL $3.28 $12.48 
INielsen 1991 . 
Some of the nonfee costs associated with the use of federal lands. such as depreciation 
and the cost of permits. do not vary in the short run. Some of the costs associated with grazing 
federal lands vary directly with the number of AUMs (e.g .. movement of livestock). We are 
particularly interested in how these variable costs are included in the objective values of an LP 
mode1. In a11 of the LP grazing models we reviewed. the grazing fee was included in the objective 
function and the nonfee costs of grazing were subtracted from the gross returns from livestock 
production. This is a logical approach but the variable costs of grazing could also be added to 
the grazing fee and not subtracted from the gross returns. For example. the data in Table 2 
shows the objective function values for one of the LP models developed by Hahn et a1.2 The 
coefficient for ELM and Forest Service grazing is only the grazing fee ($1.35 per AUM. which does 
not include any nonfee costs). while the coefficient for other sources of feed (e.g .. leased 
pastures) mayor may not include nonfee costs.3 
The coefficient for the "cow" (calf-raising) activity was derived by adding a]] of the 
nonfeed variable costs (vet and medicine. trucking. etc.). Some of these costs are associated 
with grazing on federal lands (e.g .. hauling livestock. repairs. herding) and. therefore. could be 
a110cated to the grazing activity{s). For example. if one assumes that the nonfee variable 
2We used the model developed for region 4 with 1986 prices. Similar results were obtained 
for models for the other regions outlined in Hahn et a1. The results for other regions can be 
obtained from the authors or they can be derived from the data in Hahn et al. using the 
methods suggested in this paper. 
3lt is not possible to determine what mix of fee and nonfee costs are included in the 
coefficients reported in Hahn et al. 
Table 2. Objective value coefficients for LP model. region 4. 1986 prices. 
Activity Coefficient ($) 
Cow -70.43 
Forest feed - 1.35 
BLM feed -1.35 
State feed -3.01 
Rented feed -6.09 
Irrigated pasture - 4.10 
Raised hay -32.03 
Purchased hay - 50.61 
Interest rate on borrowed capital -0.13 
Sell heifer calves 224.37 
Sell steer calves 284.41 
Sell yearling heifers 352.82 
S,ell yearling steers 417.35 
Sell cu}] cows 327.04 
Source: Hahn et al. 
cost of grazlng Forest Service lands was $3 per AUM, this would represent $1.121 
($3 times 373.8 AUMS = $1.121).4 If this cost is added to the cost of grazing Forest Service lands 
and subtracted from the "cow" activity,5 it would change the coefficients shown in Table 2 to 
-$4.35 for forest feed and -$64.48 for the "cow" activity. The manner in which these costs are 
allocated directly affects the shadow prices obtained from an LP model. 
Shadow prices 
The data in Table 3 show the shadow prices for region 4 when assumed various levels (0, 
$3, and $6) of nonfee costs are included as part of costs of grazing Forest Service lands and 
subtracted from the "cow" activity. The values shown for zero nonfee costs are s~mewhat lower 
than those of Hahn et al.. which was explained as follows: 
The objective function of our LP model charges the costs of the grazing fee to the 
enterprise. The shadow value of the LP measures the additional profit to be 
gained from the opportunity to purchase another unit of federal grazing at the 
current fee. Consequently, the total value of the federal grazing is the grazing 
fee plus its shadow value, not the shadow value alone. (Private correspondence 
from Hahn) 
The shadow prices6 shown in Table 3 represent the value of Forest Service forage for alternative 
assumed levels of nonfee costs. 
4The 373.8 AUMs represents the amount of forage that the 188 cows in the herd obtain from 
Forest Service lands. 
5lf some nonfee costs are added to a grazing activity, they must be subtracted from the 
activity where they were originally included, or they would be included twke. 
6The MPS program written by George Pfeiffer at the University of Nebraska was the primary 
software used in this analysis. Results using other computer software programs were identical. 
The above text emphasizes the shadow prices for Forest Service lands, but comparable results 
were also obtained for the other sources of forage. 
Table 3. Shadow prices for forage ($ per AUM) from Forest Service lands. region 4. 1986 prices 
for nonfee costs of 0. $3. and $6 per AUM. 
Percentage of Forest Service Shadow Prices 
Grazing Availability Amount of Nonfee Costs ($) 
0.00 3.00 6.00 
0 12.59 10.08 7.56 
25 12.59 10.08 7.56 
50 12.59 10.08 7.56 
75 3.39 0.34 0.00 
90 3.39 0.34 0.00 
100 3.36 0.31 0.00 
110 1.67 0.00 0.00 
125 1.67 0.00 0.00 
150 0.56 0.00 0.00 
The change in where the nonfee costs were allocated (Forest Service versus "cow" 
activity) did not affect the basic solution (value of the objective function and level of the other 
grazing activities),? but the allocation of nonfee costs to grazing activities had a major impact 
on the shadow prices of Forest Service grazing. 
The above results clearly show that the shadow price for a source(s) of forage depends 
upon the allocation of nonfee costs. If all of the nonfee costs of grazing any type of land (e.g., 
Forest Service) is included in the "cow" (calf-raising) activity, the shadow price for that grazing 
activity would increase by an amount at least as great as the amount of these nonfee costs. 
The allocation of nonfee costs to a particular grazing activity also has an impact on the 
shadow price of other sources of forage. These impacts are illustrated in Table 4. These results 
show that as nonfee costs are allocated to the Forest Service grazing activity, the shadow price 
of Forest Service grazing declines and increases the shadow price of the other forages. This is 
one of the reasons why rented private forage does not enter the basic solution when none of the 
nonfee costs are allocated to any of the grazing activities associated with federal lands. When 
nonfee costs were added to all of the sources of forage,8 rented forage appeared to be a more 
economic alternative. This illustrates the importance of consistent treatment of fee and nonfee 
costs of grazin~ all types of forage 
. ?]t should not be inferred from the above that changes in the allocation of nonfee costs will 
not affect the basic solution. This allocation will affect the basic solution in many (most?) cases. 
8Nonfee costs were initially added only to the Forest Service activity to simplify the analysis 
and to show how this single change affected the analysis. 
Table 4. Shadow prices for alternative sources of forages, differing levels of use and nonfee 
costs for Forest Service lands, region 4, 1986. 
Source of Forage 0.00 
Forest Service 3.36 
ELM 7.32 
State 5.39 
Rented 0.0 
lrrigated pasture 0.0 
Deeded 7.62 
Crop residue 8.17 
No Change in Use 
Nonfee Costs ($) 
3.00 
0.31 
7.53 
5.74 
0.0 
0.0 
7.73 
8.59 
6.00 
0.00 
7.61 
5.53 
0.0 
1.97 
7.97 
8.62 
50% Reduction 
Nonfee Costs ($) 
0.00 3.00 6.00 
12.59 10.08 7.56 
6.85 7.13 7.42 
4.87 5.15 5.44 
0.0 0.23 0.47 
5.04 5.38 5.71 
7.60 7.87 8.13 
7.40 7.66 7.91 
when construc~ing an LP model. lt also illustrates how the allocation of nonfee costs to just the 
Forest Servke activity instead of the "cow" activity increases the shadow prices for other 
sources of forage (e.g., ELM and state lands) derived from LP models. The addition of the nonfee 
costs of acquiring all of the sources of forage to the respective grazing activity objective 
coefficient decreases the shadow price for all of these forages. 
The consistent allocation of nonfee variable costs for all types of forage would be 
expected to affect shadow prices in different ways because nonfee costs are not equal for a]] 
types of forage. For example, some types of forage have high nonfee costs (e.g., grazing 
allotments in remote areas or those that require hauling water) while the variable costs of 
obtaining forage from some types of land (e.g., aftermath) are very small. Those types of forage 
with high variable costs would be expected to have low shadow prices when compared to those 
having low costs.9 If the nonfee costs are not consistently handled for all types of forage, one 
could have high shadow prices for those sources of forage that do not include any of the nonfee 
costs in the objective function and low values for those that do include nonfee costs. Shadow 
prices that are obtained from LP models, which inconsistently include nonfee costs in the 
objective function values for all types of forage, cannot be compared. 
The above examples illustrate how the allocation of nonfee costs to grazing activities 
affects the shadow price of that source of forage. One could just as logically allocate the fee 
and nonfee costs of grazing to the "cow" activity. If this is done, the objective values for forage 
from the various sources become zero and the cost of raising calves is increased by the same 
total amount (objective value of the cow activity becomes more negative) . As expected, 
allocating nonfee costs in this manner increases the shadow price of all forages . 
9This implicitly assumes that the two sources of forage are equally important to the animals 
that use these sources. This is a common assumption that is made when AUMs are used as the 
unit of forage . The discussion in Gray 1968 (pp. 409 - 415) clearly shows that AUM is a poor 
measure of range productivity. 
What nonfee costs should be included? 
The value of the objective function in a profit maximization model should represent the 
returns to the fixed factors of production. LP models that do not include nonfee costs as part 
of the grazing activity(s) implicitly imply that the nonfee costs cannot be allocated to grazing. 
However, some of the nonfee costs can be allocated to grazing acUvities. For example, ranchers 
can generally esUmate what costs (e.g., travel. fence repair, lost animals) are incurred when 
grazing particular types of land (e.g., see the studies by Nielsen 1982, Obermiller and Lambert 
1984, Madsen and Gee 1978, Rimbey 1989). Some nonfee costs may not be variable (e.g., 
investments in permits) or it may not be feasible to allocate costs among several activities (e .g., 
maintenance costs for a spring and pipeline that serves public and private lands). A major 
problem is that many of the nonfee costs vary with the number of cows ("cow" activity) as well 
as the source of forage. The LP grazing models reviewed imphcitly assume that the nonfee costs 
vary only with the number of animals grazed and not by the source of the forage, but some 
nonfee costs vary with the type of land as well -as by the number of animals. When this occurs, 
it is necessary to determine which nonfee costs change when the use of a particular type of land 
(source of forage) is altered. Thus, some nonfee costs of grazing should be allocated to the 
grazing activity, coefficients in LP models and not just to the cattle growing activity. This will 
require those who use an LP model to derive shadow prices which esUmate not only the fee and 
nonfee costs of grazing various sources of forage but to also determine whkh of these fee and 
nonfee costs vary with use. 
Conclusions 
Failure to consistently allocate fee and nonfee costs to grazing actjvities results in 
shadow prices that are not comparable. Furthermore. shadow prices that are derived from 
models that do not allocate any of the nonfee variable costs of grazing a type of land yield 
inflated shadow prices for forage. LP models that do not allocate any nonfee costs to grazing 
activity(s) increase the shadow prices (value of forage) by at least as much as the nonfee 
variable costs. Models designed to estimate the returns from livestock production and to 
determine the value of additional forage should either allocate both fee and nonfee variable 
costs to each type of grazing activity or recognize that the shadow prices obtain~d are inflated 
to some degree. 
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